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Naturalistic Values and Progressive
Politics
A Missing Link Between Pragmatism and Social Theory 
Christoph Henning
 
What is Sociological Pragmatism?
1 In 1921, major contributions of the Chicago School of Sociology had already appeared.1
Nevertheless, in the same year Charles Horton Cooley noted in his Journal: “A social, or
perhaps I should say, a sociological pragmatism remains to be worked out.”2 This seems
to be a strange judgment: Not only is Cooley himself often considered both a sociologist
and a pragmatist who, as a father of the interactionist paradigm, is mentioned together
with G. H. Mead and John Dewey (Schubert 1995). There is also an understanding that the
Chicago School was strongly influenced by the pragmatist philosophers and psychologists
Dewey (who taught in Chicago from 1894 to 1905) and Mead (who came with Dewey and
taught there until his death in 1931). Burgess and Park 1921, for example, extensively
quoted Dewey in their influential work; others like Charles Ellwood (1873-1946) were even
Dewey’s direct students.3 So what could this odd statement mean? 
2 A  closer  look  at  the  context  reveals  that  Cooley  attributed  this  to  William  James’s
Psychology (1890).  What  Cooley  missed  in  James  was  this:  “he  saw  men  as  separate
individuals.” Now one may wonder, how else should we look at ‘men’? To understand
Cooley right, we have to consider his own ideas: “Although William James had insight into
the social nature of the self he did not develop this into a really organistic conception of
the relation of the individual to the social whole.”4 So it is not enough to consider the
“social nature” of individual selves, which I would here interpret as a social origin or pro-
social attitudes (that is: a genetic or ethical claim). Cooley was after an ontological claim:
an organistic theory, which understood individual and society not as separate entities,
but – in a quest for unity reminding of Hegel and Dewey – as two ‘poles’ of a larger whole.
European 19th century organicism had already developed similar ideas, with Spencer and
Schaeffle  being  just  the  tip  of  the  iceberg.  However,  whether  these  theories  were
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“sociology,” or rather a speculative metaphysics of society which the emerging science of
sociology needed to overcome, this question was subject to heated debates (Small 1916,
Salomon 1926).
3 Cooley himself had developed a weakly organicist view almost 20 years earlier, holding
that “society and individual denote not separable phenomena but different aspects of the
same thing” (Cooley 1902: 37). So the sociological theory he asked for was there already.
This, however, can only mean that in this quote he did not consider his own writings
pragmatist. That leaves us with an unagitated reading of Cooley’s quote: since he did not
consider himself  a pragmatist  here,  his  own writings did not count.  And since many
sociologists were skeptic about organicist metaphysics of society, this does not tell us
much about sociological pragmatism. Just as stated before, the Chicago school could still
be counted as a qualified candidate for a ‘sociological pragmatism,’ even if Cooley himself
did not see one around.
4 In a classic paper, Hans Joas thought otherwise. He reads this quote as evidence that
certain elements of the pragmatist philosophy had not been properly ‘translated’ into
sociological theory. Interestingly, he extends this claim not only to Cooley (Joas 1992: 33),
but also to the cherished G. H. Mead (Joas 1992: 35), and even to ‘the’ Chicago sociologist,
Robert  E. Park:  “it  can  not  be  claimed  that  Park  and  his  students  succeeded  in
transforming pragmatism into a satisfactory theory of society” (Joas 1992: 48). Now, this
leads to a peculiar situation: it almost looks like a game of naming and shaming, where
the accusation to be ‘not social (or sociological) enough’ can be passed on forever: Cooley
claimed it about James (and Spencer); Mead 1930 claimed it about Cooley, now Joas claims
it about Mead and Park.5 (Ironically, today one might say this about Joas, who now has
become  a  philosophical  and  religious  writer.)  So  again  we  have  to  ask  what  this
accusation could mean. 
5 Where ‘sociology’ designates an empirical science, based on a reliable theory of modern
society, the accusation can either mean that said authors were not sociological enough. This
is the case when Joas criticizes Mead: his “ideal of democratic self-government […] is not
used to elaborate a theory of society that could also be put to sociological use” (Joas 1992:
35; “use” I here take to mean: used as a theoretical guide for empirical research). The
same  interpretation  is  at  work  where  Joas  compares  W. I. Thomas’  theories  not  to
sociology, but to “humanistic psychology” (Joas 1992: 43; like Karen Horney, Erich Fromm
or Abraham Maslow). Likewise, he claims that Park and his students had nothing to say
about class, bureaucracy or international relations (Joas 1992: 48). But the accusation can
also mean something else: Since we are looking for a sociological pragmatism, it can also
mean that a certain sociology is not pragmatic enough. We find this understanding in Joas’
text, too; for example when he criticizes Cooley for relying on emotions instead of actions
(Joas 1992: 33); or when Mead is accused of becoming an “utopist” (Joas 1980: 207; see
below). 
6 This leaves us with a dilemma: If we are looking for sociological pragmatism where we
expect  to  find  it:  in  American  academia  of  the  1920s,  we  find  sociology  as  well  as
pragmatism. But we also perceive a gap between them. It seems to be difficult to find a
proper  “sociological  pragmatism.”  However,  this  problem only  arises  from a  certain
perspective: Only if we look at sociology and pragmatism as two unrelated things we have
to search for a link in order to build a synthesis. But this narrow focus is not necessary.
Once the perspective is broadened a little, they appear as two branches of the same tree.
Then we no longer have to ‘construct’ a link, for the two branches are linked already. To
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cut a long story short, the larger stream that carried them both was the progressivist
movement.
 
Progressive Politics in Pragmatism and Early
Sociology
7 A History of Sociology from 1948 distinguishes two different “sociologies” throughout the
history of the discipline: 
Comte,  Morgan,  and  Ward  believing  that  the  main  purpose  of  sociology  is  to
facilitate planned progress, while Spencer, Sumner, and Gumplowicz held that the
great practical service of sociology is to warn against the futility and danger of the
notion that man can facilitate and hasten social progress through deliberate action.
(Barnes 1948: ix)
8 A similar  distinction between proactive  and cautionary  social  theory  could  be  made
between  Max  Weber,  who  rejected  value  judgements  in  sociology,  and  ‘valuing’
sociologists like Franz Oppenheimer; between self-proclaimed ‘critical’ theorists in the
wake of  Max Horkheimer and positivists  following Karl  Popper;  and even the debate
between Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann in the 1970s could be framed this way.
One party is in favor of progress; the other one is not against it, but only against planned 
progress, for such a planning could prove wrong-headed or illiberal. Their position rather
is  that  progress  is  happening anyway (“naturally,”  as  an evolution),  so  it  is  not  for
citizens or sociologists to decide which direction it should take.
9 Now, it is important to see that the aim to facilitate and direct progress was exactly the
program of the progressivist movement in the USA. As a political movement, it is usually
dated from 1890-1921 (Allerfeldt 2007). As an intellectual movement, however, it started
earlier,  with  Henry  George’s  Progress  and  Poverty,  written  in 1879,  being  a  landmark
publication to stir the debate. By the late 1870s, the United States witnessed rapid and
tremendous changes.  But whether this was a “progress” was an open question.  With
industrialization came inequality and poverty, and with urbanization came a growing
anonymity and a sense of alienation (Sandel 1996: 201ff.). From the beginning the debate
had a clear economic focus – more precisely, it was clear regarding the criticism of the
“rugged individualism” of the Gilded Age, but not so clear about the alternatives. Henry
Carter  Adams,  Richard  T. Ely  and  John  Bates  Clark  (soon  to  be  called  the  “ethical
economists”) were contributing to an economic critique of unfettered capitalism by the
mid-1880s already. But as liberal economists they were torn between full blown socialism
and traditional market liberalism.6 In the 1930s John Dewey still tried to find some via
media (LW 11;  cf.  Kloppenberg  1986):  even  though  he  was  in  favor  of  “industrial
democracy” as early as 1888,7 he rejected efforts of his scholars Max Eastman and Sidney
Hook to draw him towards Marxism or Trotzkyism (Phelps 1997:  55ff.,  148ff.).  To be
progressive meant to be in-between, even if it was not immediately clear what that meant
concretely.
10 Likewise,  the emergence of American Sociology since the 1880ies was motivated by a
need,  deeply  felt  by  many,  to  ‘do’  something  about  the  social  disturbances  which
accompanied the rapid industrialization and urbanization. It did not necessarily mean
that progress needed to be made. Progress was manifest anyway. What it meant was that
the socio-economic and cultural changes needed to be directed into a “desirable” direction
(to use Dewey’s moral term). Using a language of fields inspired by Pierre Bourdieu, one
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might  say  that  the  (economic)  liberalism  early  American  Sociologists  attacked  was
neither  the  emerging  large-scale  capitalism directly,  nor  its  justification  in  the  new
economic theory (the marginal revolution was only just underway). Rather, they had the
sociological version in mind which dominated the sociological  field of  this period:  the
theories of Herbert Spencer and their American complement, William Graham Sumner.8
In a Nietzschean move worthy of later liberals like Hayek, Sumner had radically ruled out
any third-wayism:
Let it be understood that we cannot go outside of this alternative: liberty, inequality,
survival  of  the fittest;  not-liberty,  equality,  survival  of  the unfittest.  The former
carries society forward and favors all its best members; the latter carries society
downwards and favors all its worst members. (Summer 1914: 25)
11 This theory posed the following difficulty: if capitalism would have been pictured as one
‘culture’  amongst  others  (which seemed possible,  given that  the  changes  were  quite
recent) it would have been easy to beg to differ. However, this was not the way the debate
was framed. Rather, capitalism was perceived as a ‘natural’ thing to have, since it was
based on nature. Sumner wrote in 1883 already: 
Certain ills belong to the hardship of human life. They are natural. They are part of
the struggle with Nature for existence. We can not blame our fellow-men for our
share of these. My neighbor and I are both struggling to free ourselves from these
ills.  The  fact  that  my  neighbor  has  succeeded  in  this  struggle  better  than  I
constitutes no grievance for me. (Sumner 1883: 17f.)
12 Once this underlying socio-natural philosophy was hegemonic, this claim could be made
in a ‘neutralist’ scientific fashion that was not open to debate. You cannot argue with
natural forces, as German Neo-Kantian Rudolf Stammler (1896: 430ff.) had insisted against
socialism. (Confronted with this ‘naturalizing’ power of ideological discourse theories of
social and participatory democracy still look week today.)
13 In  this  situation,  the progressivist  agenda to  ‘do’  something about  the situation was
facing a dead end. Of course, proponents of reform could try to bring their voice out into
the public – and for years Robert E. Park did just that when he worked as a journalist. (At
one point he planned a weekly magazine with John Dewey in order to inform the public
better.)9 However, as long as demands for, say, more real freedom and equality appeared
as efforts to argue with ‘nature,’ this had a similar effect as barking at the moon had –
none.  So in order to be heard,  the naturalistic hegemony of “laissez-faire” liberalism
needed to be broken first. Karl Marx tried to do this in his economic writings for Europe.
This is also what early American Sociologists set out to do. Frank Lester Wards Dynamic
Sociology (published 1883, the year Marx died) was attacking the laissez-faire school head
on, too.10 
14 The clue to this effort, however, was that it had to start with nature (just like Marx had
done in his German Ideology, Henning 2009). This was not just a matter of taste of authors
like Ward or Thomas who happened to be interested in biology and botanics.  Dewey
spelled out the dilemma most clearly. If nature was left aside and progressive theory
jumped to a normative view of society immediately, this remained pure articulation of
subjective taste without any moral force: 
There will be one philosophy, a realistic one, for mathematics, physical science and
the established social  order;  another,  and opposed philosophy for  the affairs  of
personal life. […] But philosophical dualism is but a formulated recognition of an
impassé in life; an impotence in interaction, inability to make effective transition,
limitation of power to regulate. (LW 1: 186)
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15 If a “continuity” between nature and society (LW 1: 6) could be demonstrated, however,
then arguments from an analysis of society could no longer be neglected with recourse to
nature. They had to be taken seriously. This explains why social sciences were crucial to
the  progressive  movement;  a  “The  Reconstruction  of  Society  by  Social  Science”  was
needed (Barnes 1948: 173ff.). But it had to be a social science that could explain itself over
and against the dominance of the natural sciences and naturalistic ideologies. For this
reason the botanist Ward was extremely important for the birth of progressive sociology:
his attack on the laissez-faire doctrine (Ward 1883 I: 31ff.) was no naïve Social Gospel or
remote moralism. It was based on a firm philosophy of nature, which was as informed
about Darwin as Sumner was. 
16 It is no coincidence, then, that Wright-Mills’ early search for the link between Sociology
and Pragmatism perceived a “tradition from Ward, through Dewey, to W. I. Thomas and
Mead” (Wright Mills 1964: 448; written 1941). “Many passages of this book [Ward 1883]
could almost have been written by John Dewey” (Wright Mills 1964: 462). I agree. What
allowed for this continuity not only between nature and society, but also between Ward
and Dewey – and that is: between early Sociology and Pragmatism? 
17 It begins with a similar philosophy of science. Science needed to prove itself for practical
purposes, or it was pointless. Describing a similar dualism between a meaningless natural
science and subjective moral judgments, Ward (who quoted Peirce in this work already)
wrote 42 years before Dewey:
The  real  object of  science  is  to  benefit  man.  A  science  which  fails  to  do  this,
however  agreeable  its  study,  is  lifeless.  Sociology,  which  of  all  sciences  should
benefit man most, is in danger of falling into the class of polite amusements, or
dead sciences. (Ward 1883: xxvii)
18 As we saw, sociology did not just aim at a random benefit, but at a planned social progress
(Wards sociocraty: “the rule of society by society”).11 How did Ward prove it was possible?
His main argument was that the “statical” perspective taken in biological theory and
sociology was not enough. Sociology needed to take “dynamical action” into account: “it
is  not  what  men  are,  but  what  they  do”  (Ward  1903: 15).  The  following  passage
foreshadows Dewey’s distinction between “habit” and action guided by “intelligence”: 
Dynamical actions are distinguished from statical actions in proceeding according
to the indirect, or intellectual, method of conation instead of the direct, or physical,
method. […] In statical actions the movements of the agent are made in straight
lines toward the end. In dynamical actions, they are not so made, but may proceed
in any other direction. (Ward 1883 II: 378)
19 Dynamic action was defined by a conscious purpose. Now, if individuals may define and
pursue a purpose, then societies should be able to do this, too. At least in Europe they did,
by developing social  insurances,  a  welfare state and municipal  services,  for example.
Experiencing this European ‘progress’ was crucial for progressive writers, many of whom
had studied in Germany. Mead, e.g., was deeply impressed “how cities sweep their streets,
manage their  gas  works  and street  cars,  their  Turnvereins”  etc.12 Being able  to  set  a
purpose  both  individually  and  collectively  (“collective  telesis,”  Ward  1898:  260ff.)
distinguished humans from other  natural  beings.  But then doing this  no longer  is  a
mistake. It does not mean to mess with mother nature if setting collective purposes is our
very nature.
20 Saying this with scientific intent, however, leads to the question which the purposes in
question are. Nature can be studied. Even if there is a difference between humans and
Naturalistic Values and Progressive Politics
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012
5
(other) animals, we should be able to say more at this crucial step. Indeed, Ward had an
idea here: he suggested to use human emotions as a key: “What function is to biology,
feeling is to sociology” (Ward 1883 II: 123). Feelings are particularly human. At the same
time they are natural enough to be a “force” in human conduct. Hence, Ward called them
“social forces” (1883 I: 480ff.). One of them – the notion of “sympathy” which already
appeared in Adam Smith – made a special ‘career’ in later progressive writings: “Reform
should be based on Sympathy” (Cooley 1909: 13f.).13 This sociology believed it could define
naturalistic values in order to direct the social progress. “Today men think for a purpose.
The purpose is one: the elevation of men” (Ward 1883 II: 123). Or, with Dewey (1920: 141):
“Growth itself is the only moral ‘end’.”
21 This  idea  of  naturalistic  values  defined  by  social  forces  was  handed  on  to other
sociologists.14 It is still visible in the writings of Albion Small (1854-1926), progressivist
and institutional father of the Chicago School. Small saw an “impulse to improve ways of
improving the world” incorporated in sociology (1916: 828). As early as 1893 (according to
Barnes 1948: 782) he formulated his objective list of human interests: “health, wealth,
sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness,” which he deduced from basic emotions
(Small 1905: 196, 682).15 Interestingly, Small quoted Dewey for these interests (Small 1905:
433).  And like Ward,  Small  perceived that there was evolutionary progress in society
anyway (“Natural life is conflict, but it is conflict converging toward minimum conflict
and  maximum co-operation  and  sociability,”  Small  1905:  371).  This  progress  needed
conscious planning and direction,  which made it  the aim of sociology to provide the
proper ends or values. Considering the methodic question how such naturalistic values
might be discovered, Small – who is often described as a minor theorist – was influenced
by Peirce, foreshadowing K. O. Apel’s and Habermas’s writings of the 1960s:
The most reliable criterion of human values which science can propose would be
the consensus of councils of scientists representing the largest possible variety of
human interests,  and co-operating  to  reduce  their  special  judgments  to  a  scale
which would render their due to each of the interests in the total calculation. This
declaration of principles […] would not be the abdication of science. It would be
science with stripped of cant.  […] It  would be science with its decks cleared for
action. (Small 1910: 260)
22 Even if this sounds like the technocratic elitism later developed by Walter Lippmann and
others, this was not the issue for Ward and Small. They rather asked for public discussion
of societal issues, based on the best knowledge available. Hence the need for a functioning
media, which was so important to Park and Dewey. Hence, also, the stress on education. It
became an  eminent  political  end  (in-view  or  not)  to  provide  good  education  for
everybody.  Dewey  and  Tufts  called  this  “equality  of  opportunity,”  Ward  even  more
pointedly “intellectual egalitarianism” (MW 5: 490 f.).16
23 The idea of the social forces moved even further, from Ward to Small, and from Small to
W.I.  Thomas  (1863-1947).  In  his  terminology  “four  fundamental  wishes”  remained
(Thomas 1921: 27): the desire for new experience,17 for security, for response (or affection
by members of the in-group) and for recognition (distinction, or a certain status within
the larger group). This anthropological base – which was later modified, but never given
up completely18 –  was  sometimes  criticized  as  un-sociological.  Wrongly,  I  think:  Its
function was not to put empirical investigations aside by ‘deducing’ something from a
fixed concept of nature as “supreme reality” (MW 12: 92). Social sciences do not have to
assume that humans can do without nature (that would be an absurd claim).  To the
contrary, an anthropological base allowed for a better sociology. It served two purposes:
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First,  in order to compare different cultures or their  mutual  impact,  what the Polish
Peasant (Thomas & Znaniecki 1918-20) did masterfully, one has to know what is to be
compared in the first place. In order to understand local differences or historical changes,
something needs to be fixed (a tertium comparationis). Otherwise we would only see drift
and fluidity, which teaches us nothing:
What distinguishes  societies  and  individuals  is  the  predominance  of  certain
attitudes over others, and this predominance depends, as we shall see below, on the
type of organization which the group has developed to regulate the expression of
the wishes of its members. […] We can, therefore, gain a better understanding of
the heritages of the immigrant groups […] by examining briefly the nature of the
human wishes and the form of the social organization which control the wishes of
our immigrants at home. (Thomas 1921: 25f.)
24 So considering these fundamental  wishes allows for better comparisons.  And what is
more, they also carry a (weak) normativity. They often are “repressed” to a great extend
(Thomas 1951: 117, written 1918), but they should not be repressed altogether: “We may
assume also that an individual life cannot be called normal in which all the four types of
wishes are not satisfied in some measure and in some form” (Thomas 1951: 144, written
1925). Thomas and Znaniecky had a ‘pragmatic’ understanding of values which bound
together objective (social) values and subjective valuations (attitudes) in a larger practical
unity. To quote the ‘famous’ phrase from the Polish Peasant:  “The attitude is thus the
individual counterpart of the social value; activity, in whatever form, is the bond between
them”  (Thomas  1951:  50,  written  1918).  Those  actions  are  neither  embedded  in  a
transcendent set of objective value, nor in a transcendental set of subjective attitudes (in
Deweyan terms,  they do not presuppose “fixed ends”),  but  in a “situation” in which
values and attitudes come together. “Every concrete activity is the solution of a situation”
(Thomas 1951: 57). So in order to understand human action, we need to understand the
situation. And consequently, in order to bring about “progress” in the course of action,
the situation needs to be changed – which includes the environment as well as attitudes.
25 Obviously this situationist approach is very close to Dewey’s take on ethics. This parallel
has  three  aspects:  methodological,  concerning  the  material,  and  in  regard  to
“progressivist” conclusions:
26 - First, in the general understanding of morality Dewey replaced what seemed to him “a
single, fixed and final goal” in traditional theories with “individualized goods and ends”
which depended on the situation. This way, “every moral situation is a unique situation”
(MW 12:  173).  In  order  to  understand  the  moral  dimension  of  an  act,  we  need  to
understand the concrete situation first, withholding the inclination to subsume it under
general principles to quickly (Dewey & Tuft 1908: 197ff.). 
27 - Secondly, this level of concretion did not lead Dewey to give up ethical theory (a possible
conclusion if only “changing, moving, individualized goods” remain, 132). Instead, his
ethics exemplarily analyzed the general “situation” of the United States in 1908 and again
in 1932. In a good progressivist fashion Dewey and Tufts (MW 5: 457) primarily describe
the “economic situation.” Ironically, the most concrete level of analysis Dewey ever got to
in terms of social theory was in ethics. 
28 - Thirdly, the normative conclusions drawn do not refer to the morality of individuals (as
in  Victorian efforts  to  legislate  morality),  but  to  the  social  conditions.  For  example,
Dewey and Tufts (MW 5: 390ff., 470ff.) elaborated the notion of “effective freedom” and
“equality of opportunity” which were already common in the progressivist literature.19
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Comparable to Thomas’ logic of the situation, it included both: working on external (e.g.,
freedom from want) as on internal conditions (e.g, freedom from fear).
29 These two schools of thought, pragmatism and the Chicago School of Sociology, found a
way to escape the accusation of a naturalistic fallacy (Bohmann 2010).  Unfortunately,
though, both poles of the “naturalistic values” – nature and value – become increasingly
difficult  to articulate in the process  of  professionalization of  a  social  science.  Values
become the object of social science the more it is confronted with pluralism (a parallel to
Max Weber in European sociology). To pursue one against the others would be partial and
naïve. Hence, Park believed that “a moral man cannot be a sociologist” (cited in Lindner
2000: 217). However, as long as sociology claims to be a progressive force in society, it
must enable others to make better value judgments. And even Park “saw sociology as
ultimately useful and practical”:
Applied sociology is not concerned with uncovering mechanisms and devices for
reform,  but  with  exposing  the  broad  setting  of  social  organization  and  human
nature which policy-makers must take into account. (Turner in Park 1967: xvi)
30 Sometimes  sociology  may even articulate  new and more  reflective  values  itself.  One
biographer of Park describes his ideal, which resembles Simmel and Habermas’ Peirceian
normative social philosophy, the following way: 
the  task  of  communication  […]  becomes  a  cultural  ideal  which  transcends
traditional  bonds,  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  common  universe  of  discourse.  […]
Communication enables individual experiences to be integrated, but not sublated.
(Lindner 1996: 112; cf. Lindner 2000: 225)
31 Consequently, human nature is not simply a “given” which may be stored in a scientific
box. In the 1920s this was shown by the critique of instinct psychology by Faris (1921), a
Chicago scholar, and Bernard (1924).20 Nevertheless, the concepts of nature and “human
nature” remained crucial ones, in both pragmatism and Chicago sociology. As Mead had
anchored  his  symbolic  interactionism in  an  organic  perspective  and  Dewey  (MW 14)
developed an anthropology of habit and impulse, Park (1915: 583) held that the study of
the city would “reveal to us human behavior and human nature generally.” Later studies
relied on a “biotic” vocabulary even stronger (Park et al. 1925), laying foundations for the
discipline of ‘social ecology.’ 
32 Systematically, therefore, these underlying naturalistic values do not mark the difference
between pragmatism and Chicago Sociology. They can be found in both branches of the
progressive tree. Before I elaborate where a crucial difference between them lies which is
often overlooked in the literature, I would like to elaborate in some detail how Dewey, the
most systematic of the progressive thinkers, explained naturalistic values. He was quite
aware of the criticism of naïve conceptions of human nature and values. Nevertheless he
spelled out a normative anthropology himself. 
 
John Dewey on Naturalistic Values 
33 European sociology could not  easily  ‘digest’  the evaluative approach in social  theory
(Tenbruck 1985).  The reason was epistemological:  The fact-value distinction was very
relevant in a European Kantian framework. However, since American progressivists were
influenced more by Hume and Darwin than by Kant,  they were less concerned about
normative  ‘valuing’  in  science.21 This  motivates  a  deeper  look  into  the  normative
implications of the naturalism typical for progressive thought from Ward to Dewey and
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Park. Clearly, their naturalism was not reductionist (Bohman 2010, Gale 2010). They did
not  try to  belittle  the  impact  of  culture  and history,  or  even of  mind and free will
(“intelligence,” in Dewey’s terms). Rather, they looked at the way their nature allowed
human beings to act and interact in different ways, creatively changing their natural and
social environment where possible. As we have seen in Ward and others, starting with a
natural perspective does not preclude arriving at social or cultural phenomena. Rather,
this  avoids  the  “dualism”  described  by  Dewey  which  would  make  these  theories
vulnerable to a criticism from the hegemonic laissez-faire naturalism. 
34 Dewey was highly critical of two different ways of thinking: as we have seen, one was the
ideological liberalism which was based on an abstract individualism. The other one was
traditionalism, based on a rigid intersubjectivism. (Both are still with us today.) Both of
them tell stories about foundations: the first one disembedds the atomistic individual
from its social settings and remodels everything in its image. Even if the model aims to be
purely formal, it is still based on a particular conception of the individual: a market-type
consumer who ‘chooses’ norms according do his interests (MW 5: 77, 478). The second
model relinquishes individuals to the social powers around them (families, tribes, local
customs  etc.).  This  social  constructivism  implies  an  ontological  claim  about  the
foundation of norms in certain social  communities.  Ironically,  today it  is  particularly
popular with readers of Mead like Habermas, Joas or Honneth. But if normative claims are
only (quasi-)based on local habits (“folkways,” Sumner 1907), on the way we do it, this has
very limited normative power in different contexts with different local habits. Neither is
it a promising prospect for a deeper and non-conformist individualism, as it was one of
Dewey’s main aims. 
35 Here is the dilemma Dewey faced: basing norms on an abstracted concept of the market-
individual (“liberty”) is ideological and over-abstract; whereas an ethics based on the self-
conception  of  pre-industrial  white  middle-class  Mid-west  American  town-life 
(“community”) is limited to this particular context. Basing ethics on the individual or the
social life may therefore both be dead ends, at least for progressivists. But not basing them
on anything is not a way out, either, for that would leave it adrift in practice, and prey to
whatever ideology comes around in theory. So where do we go from here? 
36 Dewey criticism of both theories is based on human nature. Even though both theories
claim to represent human nature, neither of them is reaching down to it. Any particular
community  is  historically  and  geographically  contingent,  and  so  is  “rugged
individualism”: it is an abstractification of another section of the same community – the
role  taken in economic transactions (at  least  in their  textbook representation).  Both
claims are taken for granted (as  natural)  by their  followers,  yet  they only represent
contingent and particular facts which are open to change. Consequently they can not be
legitimized with reference to human nature. Saying so, however, presupposes that there
is something like human nature we may refer to. (To see this, note that in order to say ‘a
is not an x,’ we need to know first what the characteristics of x are.)
37 Today many philosophers and social scientists abhor naturalist claims (Pinkert 2002), for
all too often they petrify contingent facts and try to end all discussion. However, for
Dewey this was different. If Dewey’s main interest, which attracted him to Hegel, was the
overcoming of dualism, then the dualisms of body and mind, or nature and culture, are
among the most important ones. For Dewey being at home in the world also implies to be 
at home in one’s nature, both as an individual (Dewey was a nonconformist) and, more
generally,  as a natural being. So we should expect a more positive approach towards
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human nature  then the  neo-pragmatist  allows  for.22 Indeed,  Dewey describes  human
nature as “raw materials” (MW 14: 78) that can take different shapes. It is cultivated in
many different ways, with habits as a second nature guiding most of our actions. These
habits  are  contingent  and  forever  changing.  Consequently  this  conception  can  not
prescribe a certain way of being, like theories of natural law used to do. Dewey does not
even try to define a fixed set of instincts, for even they may change (MW 14: 144). This
concept of human nature is quite liberal. In an ingenious reversal, Dewey claims that
illiberal  consequences rather have to be feared if  we base our norms on culture and
tradition:
As a matter of fact, it is precisely custom which has the greatest inertia, which is
least susceptible of alteration; while instincts are most readily modifiable through
use, most subjective to educative direction. (MW 14: 76 f.)
38 Even if this is so, taking humans ‘first nature’ (as I call it, Henning 2009) into account is
not morally empty. The biotic base, which is always present in action, is both an enabling
condition and a limit: “The natural, or native, powers furnish the initiating and limiting
forces in all education; they do not furnish its ends or aims” (MW 9: 121). The short title
for this dimension in Dewey’s thought is “impulse.” To a certain extent, it reflects Mead’s
concept of the “I,” which transcends the socialized roles a person can “take over” in so
far as it is the organic source of motivation (“The ’I’ is the response of the organism to the
attitudes of the others,” Mead 1934: 175). As a source of motivation, it is also a source for
creativity and values: 
The possibilities in our nature […] are possibilities of the self that lie beyond our
own immediate presentation […] It is there that novelty arises and it is there that
our most important values are located. (Mead 1934: 204)
39 Two non-redundant aspects need to be considered here: First, if all the different cultures
emerge from the same human nature, we have something in all plurality and difference
that unites us. Every human being is equal in this respect. We all share this common
organic nature, this humanity. For Dewey this common nature is best understood as a
human perfectibility: “Not perfection as a final goal, but the ever enduring process of
perfecting, maturing, refining is the aim in living” (MW 12: 181;  hence the desire for
growth without “fixed ends,” MW 14: 159). Everybody can do this and is doing this in fact
(remember Thomas’ fundamental wish for new experience). Without this shared human
nature, claims for equal respect, equal dignity etc. would not make much sense. They
would be ‘unfounded.’
40 The second normative aspect is dignity: Human nature has a certain normative power
because it is so fragile. Cultural forms and types of subjectivity develop from this base,
but they may also squeeze this potentiality or pose obstacles to our “growth.” Here this
anthropology strongly relates to social  theory.  If  we can not develop ourselves,  both
individually and culturally, human nature will sooner or later revolt: 
At critical moments of unusual stimuli the emotional outbreak and rush of instincts
dominating all activity show how superficial is the modification which a rigid habit
has been able to effect. (MW 14: 72)
41 Now, if under certain circumstances such outbreaks of emotions have to be considered
natural, but this “natural” dimension is the source of value, people should be given a right
to behave in this way.23 Thus, freedom is founded upon our first nature: “impulse is a
source,  an  indispensable  source,  of  liberation”  (MW 14:  75).  Hence,  protecting  this
universal  human nature  by  moral  and  legal  norms  is  protecting  cultures  as  well  as
individuals.  It  is  well  founded,  and  it  also  includes  both,  liberalism  as  well  as
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communitarianism.  Moreover,  it  is  even  cosmopolitan:  Protecting  this  “nature  of
freedom” (8; vgl. 306) is protecting a fundamental human potential that can be found in
every culture. In short, this theory is not redundant because it does not permit everything:
as soon as a certain culture (a rigid habit) starts to curtail the development of its own
people, they have a good reason to oppose this from their own context. Then, we have a
reason to share their concerns because our common nature makes us natural allies in this
respect.24
42 Against the strong intersubjectivist who may claim with Mead (1934: 167) that the “only
way in which we can react against the disapproval of the entire community is by setting
up a higher sort of community,” it is only part of the story that this would be “the voice
of reason” (ibid.: 168). It would also be the voice of our nature, which is an even stronger
one. There is not only one “reason,” as Isaiah Berlin has rightly stressed (especially if we
bind reason to situations, as Dewey and Thomas did). But there is only one human nature.
“Ethics is a part of our nature and needs no justification” (Gale 2010: 73). This is why the
old Dewey could still say:
naturalism finds the values in question, the worth and dignity of men and women,
founded in human nature itself, in the connections, actual and potential, of human
beings with one another in their natural social relationships. (LW 15: 54)
43 So for Dewey, the voices of reason and nature are not so far apart at all: In a dialectical
move  almost  resembling  Schelling,  Dewey  speaks  of  a  “stimulation  of  reflective
imagination by impulse” (MW 14: 121). We only get to intelligence through impulse: if
habits face an “interruption” or “disturbance” (MW 14: 125), impulses are set free and call
for a new direction. So reason (“an effective relationship among desires, rather than a
thing opposed to desire,” MW 14: 135) is firmly based in nature. But this is a nature that is
not coextensive with what natural sciences say about it. 
44 Even if it may lead us astray, to underpin this point here is another, even more striking
reminiscence to Schelling. It comes up when Dewey describes a feeling of unity between
nature and reason in artistic activity: 
In creative production, the external and physical world […] is subject-matter and
sustainer of conscious activity; and thereby exhibits […] the fact that consciousness
is […] the manifest quality of existence when nature is most free and most active.
(LW 1: 293)
45 This  indicates  that  for  Dewey not  only moral  values are deeply rooted in our (first)
nature. We touch the same sphere in aesthetic experiences; a trait that connects Dewey
with Adorno. Having mentioned Adorno, let me now come back to the issue of sociology.
 
Another Gap Between Pragmatism and Sociology 
46 So far I have shown that there are several traits shared by pragmatism and the Chicago
school of  sociology,  which have a common source in the progressive movement.  The
progressivist creed was based on notions of sympathy (as opposed to “atomism”), the
common good (as opposed to individual  desires)  and the “social  self” (as opposed to
egoism). It strongly linked theory to an ameliorative practice, and reconstructed theory
in order to reconstruct society. Normatively this new theory was founded on naturalistic
values. These points were elaborated by sociologists like Ward, Small or Park as well as by
Pragmatists  such  as  Mead or  Dewey.  With  the  continuous  topics  came  a  shared
methodology: these middle range theories no longer searched for general theories or
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fixed ends. They constrained themselves to analyze concrete situations, helping to find
means for the ends-in-view. In these “situations” and corresponding activities, objective
and subjective factors were bound together. Therefore, explanations could not be had by
a reduction to either subjective (psychological) or objective (structural) factors alone.
47 In all of this, no clear “gap” has yet appeared between sociology and pragmatism. Does
this mean that Joas’ and Cooley’s assumption was wrong? Yes and no: He was right in
noting a gap. I beg to differ, however, in the way this gap is described. With Joas’ rigid
criterion in mind, hardly any author would count as a sociologist; at least not the authors
using the “renaissance” of pragmatism for social theory, like Habermas, Honneth, or Joas
himself: they neither undertake empirical research, nor do they have much to say on
issues of class conflict or international politics.25 As we have seen, this could even be said
about  the  Chicago  sociologists.  So  instead  of  explaining  the  gap,  this  criterion  only
mentions another commonality. 
48 But there is a gap nevertheless. This gap has to do with two of the common themes: the
social  self,  and  naturalistic  values.  As  will  be  seen,  they  are  interrelated.
Counterintuitively,  the  more  we  allow for  nature,  the  more  individualism we  allow,
whereas  a  stress  on  sociality  transports  conformist  ideas.  In  terms  of  nature  the
difference may be described thus: There are two ways in which values can be naturalized:
either we project mind back into matter, or we follow nature reaching into the minds.
Either  way,  we  overcome  dualism and  get  a  higher  ‘unity.’  However,  these  are  two
different ‘wholes’: in Schellings terms, one is a subjective subject-object, the other one an
objective subject-object. Likewise, Marxists distinguished between idealist syntheses and
materialist ones. This seems to be philosophical hairsplitting, but following the pragmatic
maxim to look for practical consequences, it makes a tremendous difference in practice.
The first is moralizing nature, the second is naturalizing morals.
49 This, finally, is a real difference between the two schools: In spite of all its criticism (cf.
LW 1: 295 ff.), pragmatism always remained a philosophy; whereas sociology left behind
its speculative phase and professionalized itself into science. As philosophy, pragmatism
was inclined to solve problems on the conceptual level already. However, if a problem
disappears conceptually,  we may no longer perceive it  in reality (whereas perceiving
problems is the main job of empirical sociology). To us, it will rather seem as a “mistake”
or false consciousness in those who claim there is a problem. Imputing mind into matter,
or morals into nature, is doing just this: once accomplished, there no longer is a conflict,
if only we perceive the world the right way (the only problem left is how to educate the
other people, which was one of Dewey’s main aims).
50 It is not a new approach to interpret Dewey as an idealist who spiritualized nature, so I
can be brief here. Scholars have shown that Dewey kept his spiritualist beginnings all his
life, transforming it into a language in line with scientific modernism, but maintaining
that “mind is implicitly present in matter” (Gale 2010: 66). As Andrew Feffer has argued, it
survived a reshaping into empirical psychology, as visible in the well-known essay on the
reflex-arc from 1896: 
As in his earlier expositions on the New Psychology, in his reflex-arc article Dewey
sought  to  demonstrate,  incontrovertibly  and  scientifically,  the  thoroughgoing
immanence of mind in the neurological functioning of the body and the presence of
telos in the biological functions of human existence. (Feffer 1993: 148f.)26 
51 But this continuity is not limited to the early Dewey. It was made to last: 
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When  Dewey  made  the  transition  from  absolute  idealism  to  what  he  called
alternatively pragmatism, instrumentalism, or experimentalism he merely changed
the name of this background unity from ‘universal consciousness’ to experience,
this being a case of pouring old wine into new bottles. (Gale 2010: 60f.)
52 Richard  Gale  claims  that  especially  the  later terminology  of  experiments  and
“experience” carried a ‘unitarian’ and mystical philosophy:27 
The reason why no one ever understood what Dewey meant by ‘experience’ is not
because he was a poor writer, as is commonly claimed, but rather because he was
formulating a mystical doctrine. (Gale 2010: 62)
53 Now, if nature is tamed conceptually, there is nothing to fear from it. As a force (to cite
Wards) it no longer is ‘alien.’ This is certainly a good thing for individuals – in spite of his
reservations  to  psychoanalysis,  Dewey  is  quite  close  to  positive  psychology  here.
However,  when it  comes to social  matters,  there is a danger of abstracting away the
crucial  conflicts  that  arise in and from nature.  Yes,  the struggle for  life  Darwin had
focused on (“eat or be eaten”) became an ideology when everything social was read in its
image. But it also referred to something quite real in nature itself. For authors following
the other path of combining nature and values, this meant that even in society there were
‘natural’ conflicts (over territory, food, mates, access etc.). For example, when Ward (or
Marx) pointed to cut-throat-competition on the market or Park to the biotic processes in
the city, ideology would consist in not seeing this.
54 Read in this way, the accusation cited above – not to be social enough – acquires a whole
different undertone. No longer it means that the criticized author is not sociologist (that
is: empirical) enough. Rather, it is a conceptual accusation, implying that there is too
much of a dualism at work: as long as there is antagonism, or even a duality of nature and
culture, the theory is said to be ‘not social enough.’ (Remember that this is what Cooley
said about James, Mead about Cooley, Joas about Mead, and Schubert about Park – the list
could go on.)  But  then,  being ‘social  enough’  only  means to  claim that  conceptually
everything is  social  through  and  through  (or,  in  Germanic  terms,  ‘intersubjectively
constituted’). This, however, is not a sociological position, it is metaphysics. Pragmatistic
philosophers complain about sociologists who still work with a conflict between nature
and culture. Ward, for example, argued that “natural forces” like competition were still
powerful in society, so “social forces” needed to counteract them: 
All  human institutions – religion,  government,  law,  marriage,  custom – […] are,
broadly viewed, only so many ways of meeting and checkmating the principle of
competition as it manifests itself in society. (Ward 1893: 262)
55 In a review of Ward, Dewey argued against the “sharp break between culture and nature”
which he attributed to a conceptual mistake (Dewey 1894: 201ff., cf. Rafferty 2003: 107).
Park, to give another example, believed that we can not simply assume that people will
cooperate,  just  because  “cooperation”  is  in  some  way  also  natural.  As  an  empirical
scientist,  he had to concede that in real cases competition often came first,  and very
powerfully.  It  needed  a  lot  of  energy  in  order  to  (successively)  arrive  at  conflict,
accommodation, or “assimilation” (acculturation).28 He even spoke of a “natural history”
here (Coser 1971: 362).29 However, philosophers of intersubjectivity later complained that
this is a conceptual “dualism” (Schubert 2010: 91f.; cf. Joas 1992: 47f., Lindner 2000: 223f.).
I would like to defend the sociological scholars against this Hegelian pressure to achieve
reconciliation  at  a  conceptual  level  already.  If  the  problem is  real,  we  only  achieve
progress if we acknowledge the problem first, and as clearly as possible. Otherwise, if our
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theory is seeking harmony from the start, we end up criticizing the critics instead of the
problem.
56 This difference in locating nature theoretically also has an important impact on the range
of individuality a theory can afford. In the second – sociological – interpretation where
nature extends into society, we have a clear view on the Hobbesian dimension in society
(without necessarily totalizing it, which would lead to Sumners laissez-fairism). As we
saw,  this  creates  some  philosophical  discomfort,  since  conceptual  unity  can  not  be
achieved so easily. However, for the image of the individual this means that he or she is
never fully under “social control.” Apart from all their entanglements with society, they
remain an autonomous actor, a potential troublemaker – a nonconformist who is able to
use his different roles (“masks”) strategically. This qualitative individualism was one of
the main topics of the Chicago school: only to mention the unadjusted girl, the Hobo, or
the “marginal man.” For W. I. Thomas, for example, exactly this constant infighting was
the object of sociological investigation: 
There is,  of course, no pre-existing harmony whatsoever between the individual
and the social factors of personal evolution, and the fundamental tendencies of the
individual are always in some disaccordance with the fundamental tendencies of
social control. Personal evolution is always a struggle between the individual and
society  – a  struggle  for  self-expression  on  the  part  of  the  individual,  for  his
subjection on the part of society. (Thomas 1951: 164, written 1918)
57 Now if a theory is overly intersubjectivist, it looses sight of this very fact; and with this, it
ceases to be a critical  theory (Whitebook 2001).  This is  the second crucial  difference
between pragmatism and Chicago sociology: for the latter, individuals are social entities
who also have their own, partly anti-social drives; for pragmatists and neopragmatist
social philosophers, however, everything is “always already” intersubjective – or at least
it should be. This makes these theories rather smooth.30 Whereas the sociologist Albion
Small stated: “All social factors are combinations of individual facts” (Small 1905: 3), the
philosopher  G. H. Mead  argued  against Small’s  fundamental  “interests.”  They  were  –
which  comes  as  no  surprise  –  not  social  enough  (Small  1905:  472).  To  Mead,  even
individual  desires  were  socially  constituted.  However,  this  uplifting  sociality  was  a
philosophical idea, not social reality as experienced by normal people and investigated by
the  social  sciences.  Where  Mead mentioned society,  he  talked about  an  “ideal”  that
resembled spiritual community; and the “Great Community” Dewey invoked was wishful
thinking,  at  best.  Not  without irony,  therefore,  could the cultural  critic  John Patrick
Diggins claim that even in modern American literature there was more social knowledge
then in this ‘sociological imagination’:31
One can read almost the whole corpus of the literature of the ‘lost generation’ as a
countercurrent to modern sociology. ‘Primary group’ associations hardly seemed
nurturing to Sinclair Lewis, Sherwood Anderson, and other novelists in flight from
small-town  life;  technology  and  organization,  the  inventions  of  the  modern
industrial  age that Cooley looked to to revitalize ‘face to face’  relationships,  led
John Dos Passos to depict in the very structure of his narration the facelessness and
homelessness of the modern condition. (Diggins 1994: 377)
58 Even conservative Diggins was troubled by the loss of critical perspective that came as a
price for Dewey’s premature conceptual reconciliation:
Dewey used the institution of ‘marriage’ as an example of how ‘union’ with others
brings  new  levels  of awareness  and  responsibilities.  A  curious  example.
Contemporary playrights like Eugene O’Neill saw the family as a sick institution of
mendacious dialogues, repressed thoughts, ironic confrontations, hidden meanings,
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and  neurotic  personalitie.  […]  And  where  Henry  Adams  had  traced  the
disintegration of unifying principles to the eclipse of classical values at the birth of
the republic, Dewey claimed that ‘American democratic polity was developed out of
genuine community life.’ (Diggins 1994: 300f., citing Dewey LW 2: 304)
The real irony is that while Dewey and Mead saw social interaction as the answer to
private individualism, Scottish philosophers saw the social self as the basis for the
rise  of  modern  capitalism.  […]  Dewey  believed  that  pragmatism  had  extirpated
dualism for good, dissolved into social relations every absolute, and demonstrated
how truth can be made and values created when desire experiences satisfaction. So
did capitalism. (Diggins 1994: 379)
59 Not by change did Diggins (1994: 381) invoke Lionel Trillings Opposing Self: “that one may
live a real life apart from the group, that one may exist as an actual person not only at the
center  of  society  but  on  its  margings”  (Trilling  1956:  107)  –  this  was  at  risk  in  an
overinclusive intersubjectivism. So the conceptual strategy proves to have a tremendous
impact. Ironically, besides departing pragmatism from contemporary sociology, it also
broke with the pragmatic creed when it came to politics. As discussed above, the road of
reform was a “third way” between revolutionary and conservative strategies. If taken by
heart, a pragmatic politics could only test by “experiment” which strategy would work
best. Mead and Dewey, however, stopped short of this when it came to politics:
the  limits  the  Chicago  pragmatists  put  on  social  reconstruction  belied  the
democratic principles they simultaneously espoused […]. The Chicago philosophers
advocated  self-expression  but  believed  it  should  follow  a  gradually  progressive
evolution from less to more rational social organization. If radical impulse played
an increasingly important role, it did so within the confines of conservative habit
and constructive working hypothesis. (Feffer 1993: 180)
60 Joas directs a similar criticism at  Mead himself:  where Mead talks about society and
politics, he ceases to be a pragmatist and comes up with “utopian” notions how people
should behave in society, regardless of context (Joas 1980: 207f.). This leaves us with the
irony  that  even G. H. Mead,  the  master-thinker  for  the  “sociological  pragmatism”
developed  by  Juergen  Habermas,  Axel  Honneth  and  Hans  Joas  himself,  was  neither
sociological nor pragmatistic enough. Something similar may be claimed for Dewey.32 Even
in Thomas’ typology of the Bohemian, the Philistine and the creative man it is clear from
the  start  ‘who  wins’:  the  creative  man,  role  model  for  the  piecemeal-approach  of
progressive reformism, is of course superior to the blind revolutionary furore and the
phlegmatic conservatism (Thomas 1951: 161, written 1918; cf. MW 14: 156).
61 The aim of this paper was to show the common ground between pragmatism and social
theory. Hence, I do not want to overstress these differences. The philosophy of Dewey still
has  a  lot  to offer,  especially  when it  is  read in a way that  transcends the historical
context. An “opposing self” which neither finds support in a current culture, nor in given
types of subjectivity, may still find normative resources in referring to its own nature, as
described in Dewey’s philosophy. This naturalistic non-conformism may also be found in
Mead, Thomas, or Park. Therefore, my suggestion is that the next round of re-reading
pragmatism (including the Chicago School) will have to rediscover another dimension
beneath  the  topics  of  contingency  and  intersubjectivity:  namely  their  moral
perfectionism, the sophisticated ethical anthropology. Especially normative theories of
recognition  have  read  Dewey  too  much  as  a  conformist.33 In  part,  this  is  a  correct
representation  of  what  is  there  in  Dewey.  But  in  part  it  is  also  an  unnecessarily
purificatory reading. 
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Outlook: Pragmatism and Critical Theory On Politics
62 Contrary to the neo-pragmatistic understanding, I do not believe that pragmatist ethics
are necessarily post-foundational. It would be a misreading that pragmatism only has to
offer an experimental method and a situationist ethics (let’s see what helps best in every
single case). There is much more to discover. Dewey, in particular, should be read as a
‘Critical theorist’ of his own kind. Especially with the stress on habits, already prominent
in both Hume and James (1890), but essentially an Aristotelian ethical term, progressivist
writers developed an early exponent of modern perfectionism or Neo-Aristotelianism as
later articulated in Martha Nussbaum and others. Following Derek Parfit,  today those
theories are called “objective list” theories of happiness. In the social forces-approach of
Ward,  Small,  and  Thomas  we  indeed  found  such  objective  lists.  Consequently,
progressivist social theory needs to be reconstructed neither from a Darwinian nor from
a Kantian, but from an Aristotelian perspective (Chugerman 1939; Henning 2010). 
63 However, the link of pragmatism to politics seems to be a complicated issue, so will touch
it one more time. We have seen that Dewey’s and Mead’s politics were not fully in line
with their philosophy. Joas attributed this to an inconsistent translation into sociology.34
The social theory of the day itself had, or so I argued, developed a more consistent way of
allowing  for  naturalistic  arguments  in  social  theory.  However,  due  to  their
professionalization they ceased to forge bridges to politics; leaving it to politicians to
draw the conclusions. How to get from naturalistic values to progressive politics remains
an  open  question.  Would  they  have  lead  to  a  different  political  agenda,  with  more
experimentalism  in  politics?  Consider  Dewey’s  relation  to  socialism.  Karl  Marx  had
developed a radical political theory that was based not only on his economic theory, but
also  on  naturalistic  values  quite  similar  to  the  ones  guiding  progressivism;  only  to
mention the ethos of self-realization by way of creative activity or the communal self-
governance, including “industrial democracy”; a goal Dewey and Mead basically shared
(fn. 7). Why, then, did pragmatists not embrace Socialism (as one of the main “European
social theories”) more openly? 
64 Applying  pragmatism  to  this  question  gives  a  surprising  answer:  it  was  not  due  a
difference in principle, for neither pragmatism nor Marxism dealt with principles that
much. In fact, both schools aimed to think in a more mundane way, analyzing facts and
guiding action without descending into scholastic debates. The answer rather lies in the
situation. In the late 1930s, the situation of the day, especially within the leftist New York
intellectual scene, was already one of a growing – but painful – disentanglement from
Stalins Russia in the 1930s. Nevertheless, Frankfurt School theorists attacked pragmatism
as “positivistic,” again implying that it was not political and ‘social enough.’ Either this
contextualization had completely  escaped the Horkheimer circle  (as  had the debates
about  Hegel,  Marx,  and Lenin between Eastman and Hook),35 or  their  own “political
alignment” was very questionable, as Joas (1992: 104) implies. So in retrospective Sidney
Hook  (“Dewey’s  bulldog,”  who  rushed  to  defend  pragmatism)  has  clearly  won  this
encounter. His strong link of science and practice allowed him a clear stand not only in
theory, but also in politics; e.g. towards communism – a topic avoided by Critical theory
for a long time. Hook was aiming at a social theory both critical and pragmatic. He had
already  lost  his  Hegelian  spillovers  due  to  an  earlier  encounter  with  Max  Eastman,
another former student of Dewey. For years Eastman and Hook had quarreled in public
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about the proper way to apply pragmatism to Marxism, and both of them to politics. Both
had  tried  to  draw  Dewey  into  Marxism,  without  much  success  (at  least,  he  helped
defending Trotzky). Ironically, both of them became decisive Cold War-Anticommunists
some years later.  In any case, this confrontation between two of the most influential
schools of social theory – pragmatism and Critical Theory – has certainly not contributed
to solving the question how natural values could be applied to politics.36 It could only be
answered with respect to a concrete situation.
65 Therefore, this questions remains to be asked today. It is no coincidence that many of the
progressive topics resurface today – human sympathy in the new moral sentimentalism,
the larger mind in phenomenological theories of we-intentionality, and progress in the
efforts to ‘direct’ an unregulated global capitalism. Currently evolutionary psychologists
again argue in favor of empathy and cooperation, against ideologies trying to naturalize
the  market  egoism of  contemporary  capitalism (Tomasello  2009,  de  Waal  2010).  The
suggestion I made in this article is that in order to ask these questions anew, it is
desirable  to  reconsider  the  theory  of  naturalistic  values  implicit  in  the  progressive
movement,  including  Dewey,  but  also  including  American  sociologists  preceding the
Chicago school. Many arguments pragmatists have made can be found there already, in a
way that was less sophisticated, but more open to real life situations than Dewey and
Mead were in some of their writings
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALLERFELDT K. (ed.), (2007), The Progressive Era in the USA: 1890-1921, Aldershot, Ashgate. 
BARNES H. E. (ed.), (1948), An Introduction to the History of Sociology, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press.
BERNARD L., (1924), Instinct. A Study in Social Psychology, New York, Holt.
BOHMAN J., (2010), “Ethics as Moral Inquiry: Dewey and the Moral Psychology of Social Reform,” in
Cochran M. (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Dewey, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
BURGESS E. W. & R. E. PARK (eds.), (1921), Introduction to Science of the Sociology, Chicago, University
of Chicago Press.
CHUGERMAN S., (1939), Lester F. Ward: The American Aristotle, Durham, Duke University Press. 
COHEN N., (2002), The Reconstruction of American Liberalism, Chapel Hill, University of North
Carolina Press.
COOLEY C. H., (1902), Human Nature and the Social Order, New York, Scribner.
COOLEY C. H, (1909), Social Organization. A Study of the Larger Mind, New York, Charles Scribner’s
Sons.
COSER L. A., (1971), Master of Sociological Thought, New York, Harcourt. 
Naturalistic Values and Progressive Politics
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012
17
DAHMS H. J., (1994), Positivismusstreit. Die Auseinandersetzungen der Frankfurt Schule mit dem logischen
Positivismus, dem amerikanischen Pragmatismus und dem kritischen Rationalismus, Frankfurt,
Suhrkamp.
DE WAAL F., (2010), The Age of Empathy. Nature´s Lessons for a Kinder Society, New York, Three Rivers. 
DEWEY J., (1888), “The Ethics of Democracy,” The Early Works of J. Dewey, 1982-1898, vol. 1 (EW 1), ed.
by J. A. Boydston, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville 1969. 
DEWEY J., (1894), “Review of F. L. Ward, The Psychic Factors of Civilization,” The Early Works of J.
Dewey, 1982-1898, vol. 4 (EW 4), ed. by J. A. Boydston, Southern Illinois University Press,
Carbondale and Edwardsville 1971. 
DEWEY J., (1916), Democracy and Education. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, The Middle
Works of J. Dewey, 1899-1924, vol. 9 (MW 9), ed. by J. A. Boydston, Southern Illinois University Press,
Carbondale and Edwardsville 1980.
DEWEY J., (1920), Reconstruction in Philosophy, The Middle Works of J. Dewey, 1899-1924, vol. 12 (MW 12),
ed. by J. A. Boydston, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville 1982. 
DEWEY J., (1922), Human Nature and Conduct, The Middle Works of J. Dewey, 1899-1924, vol. 14 (MW 14),
ed. by J. A. Boydston, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville 1983.
DEWEY J., (1925), Experience and Nature, The Later Works of J. Dewey, 1925-53, vol. 1 (LW 1), ed. by J. A.
Boydston, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville 1983.
DEWEY J., (1935), Liberalism and Social Action, The Later Works of J. Dewey, 1925-53, vol. 11 (LW 11), ed.
by J. A. Boydston, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville 1987.
DEWEY J., (1943), “Anti-Naturalism in Extremis,” The Later Works of J. Dewey, 1925-53, vol. 15 (LW 15),
ed. by J. A. Boydston, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville 1989.
DEWEY J. & J. TUFT (1908), Ethics, The Middle Works of J. Dewey, 1899-1924, vol. 5 (MW 5), ed. by J. A.
Boydston, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville 1978. 
DIGGINS P., (1975), Up From Communism. Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual Development,
New York, Columbia University Press. 
DIGGINS P., (1992), The Rise and Fall of the American Left, New York, Norton. 
DIGGINS P., (1994), The Promise of Pragmatism. Modernism and the Crisis of Knowledge and Authority,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
DIGGINS P., (2005), “Sidney Hook, Robert Nozick, and the Paradox of Freedom,” Social Philosophy
and Policy 22, 200-20.
EISENACH E. J., (1994), The Lost Promise of Progressivism, University Press of Kansas.
FARIS E., (1921), “Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses?,” in Faris E. (1937), The Nature of Human Nature,
New York, McGraw.
FEFFER A., (1993), The Chicago Pragmatists and American Progressivism, Ithaca, Cornell University
Press.
GALE R. M., (2010), “The Naturalism of John Dewey,” in M. Cochran (ed.), The Cambridge Companion
to Dewey, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 55-79.
GREEN T. H., (1881), “Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract,” in Works III, New
York 1969.
Naturalistic Values and Progressive Politics
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012
18
HENNING C., (2009), “Karl Marx,” in Bohlken E. & Thies C. (eds.), Handbuch Anthropologie. Der Mensch
zwischen Natur, Kultur und Technik, Stuttgart, Metzler.
HENNING C., (2010), “Natur und Freiheit im Perfektionismus: Zum Verständnis der Natur des
Menschen in progressiven Traditionen,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 5/2010.
HOFSTADTER R., (1955), The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R., New York, Knopf.
HONNETH A., (2000), “Zwischen Prozeduralismus und Teleologie: Ein ungelöster Konflikt in der
Moraltheorie von John Dewey,” in Joas H. (ed.), Philosophie der Demokratie: Beiträge zum Werk von
John Dewey, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp.
HORNEY K, (1937), The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, New York, Norton. 
JAMES W., (1890), Principles of Psychology, 2 Vls., Reprint 2007, New York, Cosimo.
JOAS H., (1980), Praktische Intersubjektivität. Die Entwicklung des Werks von G. H. Mead, Frankfurt,
Suhrkamp. 
JOAS H., (1992), Pragmatismus und Gesellschaftstheorie, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp.
KLOPPENBERG J., (1986), Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and
American Thought 1870-1920, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
KROPOTKIN P., (1902), Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, London, Heinemann.
LEPENIES W., (1985), Between Literature and Science. The Rise of Sociology, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
LEWIS J. & R. SMITH, (1980), American Sociology and Pragmatism: Mead, Chicago Sociology, and Symbolic
Interaction, Chicago, Chicago University Press.
LINDNER R., (1996), The Reportage of Urban Culture. Robert Park and the Chicago School, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press. 
LINDNER R., (2000), “Robert Ezra Park,” in Kaesler D. (ed.), Klassiker der Soziologie, München, Beck.
MANICAS P., (2008), Rescuing Dewey. Essays in Pragmatic Naturalism, Lanham, Lexington Books. 
MEAD G. H., (1930), “Cooley’s Contribution to American Social Thought,” American Journal of
Sociology 35, 693-706.
MEAD G. H., (1934), Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press. 
ODIN S., (1996), The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism, Albany, State University of New York
Press.
PARK R. E., (1915), “The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the City
Environment,” American Journal of Sociology 20, 579-83. 
PARK R. E. et al., (1925), The City: Suggestions for the Study of Human Nature in the Urban Environment,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press
PARK R. E., (1967), On Social Control and Collective Behavior, R. Turner (ed.), Chicago, University of
Chicago Press.
PINKER S. (2002), The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature, New York, Penguin.
PHELPS C., (1997), Young Sidney Hook. Marxist and Pragmatist, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Naturalistic Values and Progressive Politics
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012
19
PRIER S., (2008), “A Peirceian Panentheist Scientific Mysticism,” Journal of Transpersonal Studies 27,
20-45
RAFFERTY E. C., (2003), Apostle of Human Progress: Lester Frank Ward and American Political Thought,
1841-1913, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield 
RORTY R., (1977), “Dewey’s Metaphysics,” in Cahn S. (ed.), New Studies in the Philosophy of John Dewey
, Lebonon, NH, University Press of New England.
ROSS D., (1991), The Origins of American Social Science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
ROSS E. A., (1901), Social Control, New York, MacMillan.
SALOMON G., (1926), “Die organische Staats- und Gesellschaftslehre,” in Salomon G. & Delatour G.
(2012), Schriften, ed. C. Henning, Wiesbaden, VS.
SANDEL M., (1996), Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, Cambridge, MA,
Harvard University Press.
SCHUBERT H. J, (1995), Demokratische Identität. Der soziologische Pragmatismus von Charles Horton
Cooley, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp.
SCHUBERT H. J. et al., (2010), Pragmatismus zur Einführung, Hamburg, Junius.
SHALIN D. N., (2011), Pragmatism and Democracy. Studies in History, Social Theory, and Progressive
Politics, New Brunswick, Transaction. 
SMALL A. W., (1905), General Sociology, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
SMALL A. W., (1910), The Meaning of Social Science, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
SMALL A. W., (1916), “Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States (1865-1915),” American Journal of
Sociology, XXI.6, 721-864.
STAMMLER R, (1896), Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, Leipzig,
Veit.
SUMNER W. G., (1883), What Social Classes owe to Each Other, New York, Harper.
SUMNER W. G., (1907), Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs,
Mores, and Morals, Boston, Ginn.
SUMNER W. G., (1914), The Challenge of Fact and other Essays, New Haven, Yale University Press.
TENBRUCK F., (1985), “George Herbert Mead und die Ursprünge der Soziologie in Deutschland und
Amerika,” in Joas H. (ed.), Das Problem der Intersubjektivität: Neuere Beiträge zum Werk von George
Herbert Mead, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp.
THOMAS W. I. & F. ZNANIECKI, (1918-20), The Polish Peasant in Europe and America: Monograph of an
Immigrant Group, 5 Vls., Boston, Badger.
THOMAS W. I., (1921), Old World Traits transplanted, New York, Harper.
THOMAS W. I., (1951), Social Behaviour and Personality, Westport, Greenwood.
TOMASELLO M., (2009), Why we cooperate, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
TRILLING L, (1956), A Gathering of Fugitives, Boston, Beacon Press.
WARD F. L., (1883), Dynamic Sociology, 2 Vls., New York, Appleton.
WARD F. L., (1893), The Psychic Factors of Civilization, Boston, Glinn
Naturalistic Values and Progressive Politics
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012
20
WARD F. L., (1897), Outlines of Sociology, New York, MacMillan. 
WARD F. L., (1903), Pure Sociology. A Treatise on the Origin and Spontaneous Development of Society, New
York, MacMillan. 
WARD F. L., (1918), Glimpses of the Cosmos, New York, Putnam.
WHEATLAND Th., (2009), The Frankfurt School in Exile, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
WHITEBOOK J., (2001), “Mutual Recognition and the Work of the Negative,” in Rehg W. & Bohman J.
(eds.), Pluralism and the Pragmatic Turn. The Transformation of Critical Theory, Cambridge MA, MIT
Press.
WRIGHT MILLS C., (1964), Sociology and Pragmatism. The Higher Learning in America. (Dissertation from
1941), New York, Oxford University Press.
NOTES
1. Park 1915, Thomas & Znaniecki 1918-20, Burgess & Park 1921, Thomas 1921.
2. Cooley, Journal XXII, 1921, cited from Odin (1996: 162), also cited in Joas (1992: 33).
3. Lewis  &  Smith  (1980:  167).  They  also  describe  pragmatism’s  impact  on  W. I. Thomas  and
Herbert Blumer.
4. Odin (1996: 162), as in note 2.
5. For Cooley’s verdict on Spencer see Coser (1971: 319). For Joas Mead remains a sociological
champion. Lewis & Smith 1980 made the stronger claim that Mead is no sociologist at all: he was
interested in ethics and empirical psychology, but has never conducted sociological research or
taught sociology (the same is true for Dewey, Peirce and James).
6. See Eisenach (1994, 138ff.), and Cohen (2002, 143ff.).
7. Concerning  the  “supposed  tendency  of  democracy  toward  socialism,  if  not  communism,”
Dewey proclaimed: “there is not need to beat around the bush in saying that democracy is not in
reality what it is in name until it is industrial” (EW 1: 246; see Feffer 1993: 142ff.). For Mead’s
position on “socialism”; see Shalin (2011: 37ff., 51f.).
8. On Sumner see D. Ross (1991: 85ff.); Cohen (2002: 148ff.). 
9. Lindner (2000: 215); cf. Coser (1971: 368f.). 
10. See Barnes (1948: 173ff.), Hofstadter (1955: 67ff.); D. Ross (1991: 88ff.); Rafferty 2003.
11. Ward (1883 I: 60); cf. Chugerman (1939: 319ff.).
12. Mead in a letter from 1890, cited in Shalin (2011, 46). As many will remember, Lenin was
impressed, too; especially by the German post office. 
13. Cf. Cooley (1902: 136ff.); E. A. Ross (1901: 7ff.); and Kropotkin 1902.
14. See Lewis & Smith (1980: 155ff.); Schubert (2010: 80ff.). 
15. The “health interest” is subdivided into “Food,” “Sex” and “Work interest.”
16. Ward (1918 VI: 337), cf. Chugerman (1939: 439).
17. Schubert  (2010:  81)  sees  an influence of  Peirce  here:  creative  action is  not  necessarily  a
response to an external problem, but may also result from a desire for play or creation.
18. Thomas (1951: 111-44) documents versions of this theory from 1917 to 1925. Park & Burgess
(1921: 435-504) have a long chapter about “social forces,” with many authors.
19. Green 1881; Ward (1883 II: 233: liberty is “the power to act”); Cooley (1902: 433ff.).
20. This  is  a  parallel  to  German  “philosophical  anthropology”  of  the  1920s,  which  also
maintained that there is a human nature, but it neither determines nor predicts human behavior.
21. Dewey  clearly  acknowledged  his  Darwinian  influences  several  times.  In  the  foreword  to
Human Nature and Conduct from 1930, he also endorsed Hume (see Bohman 2010: 191).
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22. For  Rorty  1977,  Dewey’s  naturalism  was  a  lapse.  In  German  political  philosophy  this
interpretation is still relevant (Honneth 2000).
23. Put traditionally: Ultra posse nemo obligatur.
24. Whereas Dewey traveled to China, Japan, Turkey, and Russia, members of the Chicago school
(Thomas, Park, and Faris, e.g.) later turned to migration and so-called “race relations” in the USA
in order to promote some progress there.
25. Apart from commenting on pragmatists, neither are they pragmatistic (which is not a shame,
no one has to be): their philosophy does not analyze concrete situations, but aims at general
theories and highly abstract concepts like communicative action, recognition, or value.
26. “One thing Dewey accomplished through his reconstruction of psychological terminology was
to claim the mantle of science for a philosophical tradition in danger of being closed out of the
experimental laboratory” (Feffer 1993: 149f.).
27. Peirce and James were open to mysticism, too (Prier 2008).
28. To quote the order of chapters in Burgess & Park 1921, cf. Coser (1971: 359f.).
29. To readers of Walter Benjamin this sounds familiar. Probably the link is Wilhelm Windelband,
with whom Park wrote his Dissertation in 1905.
30. Axel Honneths latest book from 2011 is an example for this tendency. 
31. For the relationship of literature to sociology see Lepenies 1985.
32. For Diggins 2005, Dewey ceased to be a pragmatist when it came to democracy: It was no
longer an “end in view” that could be falsified by future experience; it was as firmly based and
deeply rooted in human life as anything has ever been in traditional philosophy.
33. A wish for recognition was already present in Thomas’ four wishes, but only as one among
many.  Since  it  is  based  on  social  distinction,  it  has  rather  anti-social  effects  (sometimes
bordering  on  neurosis,  see  Horney  1937).  So  looking  back  at  these  debates  may  help
contemporary theory to resharpen its critical teeth.
34. Remember that Karl Marx had claimed philosophy needed to be overturned (into science)
and realized (into practice; the German terms are “aufheben” and “verwirklichen”). 
35. Hooks debates with Eastman are described by Diggins (1975: 51ff.; 1992: 158ff.) and Phelps
(1997:  38ff.,  96ff.);  Hooks encounter with Horkheimer by Dahms (1994:  191ff.)  and Wheatland
(2009: 97ff.).
36. Despite obvious parallels, especially between Marcuse and Dewey. Marcuse had actually read
Dewey and even contributed some reviews (see Dahms 1994).
ABSTRACTS
The paper argues that Dewey’s ethics are based on a naturalistic theory of value. This unusual
interpretation questions the anti-naturalist reading of Dewey in the wake of Richard Rorty and
other neo-pragmatists. In order to defend this interpretation, I develop a genealogy of Dewey’s
pragmatic  naturalism:  It  has  a  ’father’  in  the  progressivist  movement,  and  a  ’sister’  in  the
Chicago Sociology. A closer look at Frank L. Ward, Albion Small, W. I. Thomas and Robert Park
helps to reconstruct the political dynamics of the progressivist programme of naturalistic values.
This contextualization may also correct some of the shortcomings of Dewey’s own version: Some
pragmatic sociologists spelled out the noncomformist individualism more clearly than Dewey’s
philosophy did. Finally I suggest that this approach is still relevant today.
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